Abstract: From a phenomenological standpoint, practical agency can be understood as an embodied attempt to transform some feature—material, social, or historical—of the lived world. What kinds of norms govern this activity? With a focus on Merleau-Ponty’s view of freedom and action, this talk proposes that, on his view, the norms governing practical agency are natural-historical: while practical projects typically aim to transform an existing field of action-possibilities, their governing norms originate in life’s organizing principles. More strongly, I will argue, Merleau-Ponty’s view of the basic form of social life that can secure maximal possibilities for the exercise of freedom is anticipated by a natural norm that tracks the logic of dynamic equilibrium or homeostatic unity. By showing that Merleau-Ponty’s view of practical agency is grounded on metaphysically robust—even if revisionary—naturalistic premises, this interpretation answers the criticism that his social and political thought lacks a normative core. In doing so, it suggests a reading of natural-historical normativity that packs a more critical punch than alternative versions. Finally, my interpretive hypothesis helps us think through some practical implications that a natural-historical conception of practical normativity might have for a democratic polity. 

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